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PATTERNS OF FOREIGN· MILITARY INTERVENTION:
1948-67

INTRODUCTION
The movement of one country's troops to a foreign state's territory u~ua 1ly profoundly affects politics and 1ife 1n both co1.mtri es
and may even implicate third countries.

9

Yet 0 researchers are just be-

ginning to discover what those effects are.

For 1nstancep the Viet-

nam war has been costly in human 1i fe and material resources s but there
is remarkably little accurate information about the war's costs and
effects.

Death statistics have been inflated for one side and probably

deflated for another; the number of II refugees" has been reported 11 but
people who enter relocation centers are no longer counted as refugeesa highly unrealistic policy; inflation in South Vietnam and the US has
increased. but the precise consequences of this increase for groups in
Vietnamese or American society remain unclear--inflation may benefit
certain people in- powerful positions.
0.

Perhaps popular revulsi.on at war

has increased and will limit future Vietnams; but perhaps, also 9 tradi ti ona 1 apathy wi 11 reemerg·e and decrease such restraints u wh11 e those
who view Vietnam as either profitable or useful may increase their decision-making power.

If .so little is known about the consequences of one

of history's most widely publicized and controversial interventions, how
great is our ignorance of the factors leading to and consequences of
other, 1ess noted mil 1tary interventions I
If the object is to understand and control the factors leading to
and stemming from foreign military intervention, existing treatments of
the intervention notion are not very helpful, because:

(1) they leave

out many instances of intervention; (2) they do not allow for the
possibility that military intervention is not a single phenomenon, but
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rather that there are a variety of types of interventions each type
normally preceded and followed by a different set of circumstances;
and ( 3) they do not inc 1ude efforts to identify the circumstances,
behavior patterns, and consequences of each particular type of intervention.
In this study foreign military intervention is classified to
correct for previous shortcomings, cover cases overlooked in previous
intervention analyses and specify particular types of intervention,
each of which seems to stem from particular sets of circumstances
(some of which may be manipulated to affect the probability of various
types of intervention) or to entail particular sets of consequences.
A basic assumption is that in foreign military interventions, troops
of one country undertake military action inside another (target)
country, and thereby,. affect the sovereignty of the target country;
such military actions since 1948 (listed in the Appendix and derived
from the Ne~ York Times~ regional chronologies such as the Middle
, East Journal and Afric~n Research Bulletin, previous conflict studies
such as Bloomfield and Beatties
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in 1971, and from scholarly histories

of certain conflicts--using only events reported as fact in such
sources rather than those alleged by various governments to have
occurred but which are never reported as fact in media or research)
have been reviewed.

From this review.cit appears that certain key

factors help distinguish interventions:

the characteristics of coun-

tries involved in the interventions (level of military power, type of
governmental political goals~ internal political ot social conditions,
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etc.), the political, social, or economic issues involved, the

11

affect 11

of the military action (friendly or hostile to certain actors), the
geographical location of the intervention, the duration and magnitude
.ft'·.

of fighting or military action, the political situation in intervening
country, target, region, or world.

Because of location, extent of

fighting~ power and political position (supporting or opposing intervention) of actors, and type of political situation, particular interventions may become major international issues with implications
for many countries (Suez, Vietnam, Korea), while others concern certain regions or powers (India-Pakistan, Cyprus, USSR-Hungary-1956),
and still others remain relatively isolated and of little international concern (Ethiopia-Sornal ia, Pakistan-Afghanistan, France into
certain African states in the l960's).

French interventions in the

Middle East (including Suez and North Africa) and Indo-China created
world-wide interest and grave political consequences for France and
the target states, while French interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa
(an area evidently of relatively little super-power interest) went
essentially unnoticed in the rest of the world, and seem to have had
much more des1rable·results for the French government.

If the ef-

fects of intervention are ever to be understood, and if intervention
probability is ever to be controlled~ reasons for such variatio!'ls
must be discovered;

the reasons seem to involve the variables men-

tioned above and discussed in this study.
Previous Intervention Studies
Previous studies and definitions of intervention do not help
identify the actors, issues, affect, duration, or pol itica 1 circumstances
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of specific interventions or types of intervention; they also fail
to include certain military actions with important political, social,
or economic implications. Obviously, interventions and their effects
on intervener, target, or other countries cannot be explained or controlled unless the researcher is able to specify the onset and duration of, as well as military actions involved in~ the intervention.
Previous studies have failed to clearly delimit and describe, let
alone ·account for, interventions.
Many theorists conceive of interventions (in much of the literature no distinction is made between military and non-military intervention, but the definitions can be applied specifically to military
1ntervention) as intrusions directed at target states I authority
structures.

(See Rosenau, 19699 160-65,) This evidently means that

interventions affect the probability that the government 1n the target state will continue to hold office or that the target's form-of
government will remain the same. Often interventions are seen as
hostile intrusions opposing or coercing target governments {see
Beloff, 1968:198), and some theorists (Young, 1968:177-78 and Sullivan,
1969:2) would .exclude from intervention definitions attempts to af

0

;

feet targets I pol ic 1e~ wh1 ch do not also affect authority structures.
(Young» 1968:177-78) , Rosenau (1969:160-65) adds the additional pro.

vision that military interventions are convention-breaking.'' 1.e.,
11

that they break regularized patterns of behavior (here, conventionbreaking evidently' does not mean violation of formal international
conventions--such ai the Geneva Convention).
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· These definitions are overly restrictive, exclude too many military intrusions which have implications for target state's sovereignty,
fail to differentiate cases of intervention which might relate to cer-

tain sets of variabfes, but not to other sets, and give too few benchmarks to determine when interventions begin and end.

Troops may be

moved to target states to aid rather than oppose target governments
(whet~er or not domestic disputes between government and opposition
groups occur in the target state); such intrusions affect a target's
political system, but are not necessarily hostile or coercive to the
target government or factions.

UK interventions in oil-rich or stra-

t~gical ly located Arab sheikhdoms would.be examples of such friendly
aqtion.

Furthermqre, it is very difficult to determine when an inter-'

v~ntion is "aimed at authority structures." Any troop movement into
a target state--whether border incident, pursuit of fleeing refugees,

attack on terrorist sanctuaries (e.g., Israel into Lebanon)--has implications for targets' authority structures. Any time troops enter
a foreign state, that state's population may hold its government resp9nsible.

Vet troops chasing refugees or attacking terrorists may

not clearly direct actions at the government or central political system of the country they enter. Such actions may affect target government's po 11 c1 es rather than authority structures; 1eaders' tenure in
office may ~ot be threatened, but leaders may see needs to change
their policies, appease, or oppose the invaders.

Obviously, it could

be argued that any change of policy 1s ultimately motivated by concern for tenure in office, but some threats to authority structures
ar~ more immediate than others.

It may be important to distinguish
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interventions with immediate impacts on tenure in office from those
with more long-range impacts.

In any case, it seems futile arbitrarily

to include in intervention definitions effects on authority structures
while excluding effects on policies.
The requirement of effects on authority structures is too vague
to be useful in defining interventions.

How must authority structures

be affected? Must there be a serious threat to continued tenure in
office? Can the authority structure of one state be affected by attacks on another state, and is this intervention in both states? Must
invading forces directly engage the forces of the target state, and
are consequences for the target different if they do or do not engage
these forces?

If consequences vary, perhaps intervention is not a

singular concept, and perhaps not all interventions affecting authority
structures are equal.

It is difficult to see effects on authority

structures; often these must be assumed, and it might be assumed that
any military action affects authority structures somewhere. Thus,
unless many clear distinctions are made about types of effects on
authority structures, and unless clear guidelines for identifying
such effects are given, the authority structure criterion is of little use in deciding wh~ch cases to include or exclude in intervention
studies and which interventions seriously affect disputes, policies,
or conditions in various states.
Th~ suggestion that interventions must be "convention-breaking"
is also unworkable in identifying and describing interventions. The
Vietnam war became highly "conventional 11 --i .e., people got very used
to it--after eight (or more) years; yet

fr would be a distortion to
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say that American intervention in South and North Vietnam ended before all troops were removed.

The fact that parties grow accustomed

to a situation does not change the nature of the action (unless the
intervening country formally annexes the target); in its eighth year,
U.S. Vietnam policy was as much (or more) an intervention in internal
and external Vietnamese affairs as it was in the first year.

Further-

more, it is very difficult to determine when relations and behavior
patterns become regularized; this varies from case to case.
While some theorists argue that interventions cease when relations become regularized, others (Sullivan, 1969) note a new intervention whenever a new military action takes place.

Thus, in the US

Dominican_ Republic intervention, every time US troops went to downtown Santo Domingo and were shot at, a new intervention would be noted.
Obviously this is not a useful approach; the number of such "interventions" that could be identified for Vietnam alone would be incomprehensibly large (evidently for this r~ason, neither Vietnam nor Korea
is included in the Sullivan study).

It seems reasonable to conclude

that there was a single US intervention in the Dominican Republic
(perhaps two, if the initial e~acuation is separated from subsequent
intervention 1n the Dominican domestic dispute).

Vietnam and Korea

each seemed to entail two or three US interventions--with new interventions identified when step-level changes in intensity of fighting
occurred, or when new political, social, economic, or strategic goals
I

or issues were associated with the intervention.
Thus, the commencement and duration of interventions can be
specified according to the level of troop commitment or fighting,·
the type of goals enunciated by leaders or reasonably associated with

8

the intervention in historical accounts, and any lulls in or resumptions of military action.

If there is a step-level change in the

number of troops or severity of fighting at any point, if goals are
clearly changed, or if troops are reintroduced into a target after
a prolonged ceasefire or lull, a new intervention, and perhaps a new
type of intervention, may be identified.

Admittedly, it may be dif-

ficult to identify step-level changes or lulls in activity, but such
changes and lulls, along with political, economic, social, or strategic motives (where given and credible) or circumstances of interventicin, seem to be the most meaningful and useful criteria for delimiting military interventions.
j

Types of Foreign Mil i tart Intervention
The least ambiguous way to determine when foreign military intervention occurs is to look for the movement and action of troops or
military forces--the movement of troops or military forces, under
orders or with some official leadership, by one independent country
(o~ grbu~ of countries in concert) across the border of another independent country, or action by troops already stationed in the target country.

Moving or encamping regular troops in, or unleashing

military forces (including bombing and shelling) on a target are
relatively clearly defined acts, relatively easily identified.
n~y

Troops

do various things once inside- the target--fight, advise, spend

money, conceive children, install new governments--but since almost
anything they do will affect policies or conditions in the target,
their presence constitutes interference with target government's
sovereignty regarding domestic and/or foreign policy.

(The provision
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about orders or leadership of troops is included to diminish the
possibility that random or accidental border crossings--by lost or
drunken soldiers, for example--will be counted as interventions;
orders need not come from governments, but rather--as in the case
i

of

Japanese action in Manchuria--may come from army commanders.)
While, in general, any organized border crossing by military

units is an intervention, this covers a wide variety of actions,
some of which may entail greater consequences and relate to different sets of variables than others. Through empirical analysis
of interventions since 1948 (see Appendix), specific types of intervention can be identified and associated with particular sets of
variables. Consequences and causes of intervention may vary according
to at least three factors: 1ength of intervener presence, duration
of combat-related activity by intervener, and affect of intervener
toward target government. As Table 1 111 ustrates, intervener may
station trc>ops on target territory for long periods, or may withdraw
quickly. At the same time, intervener may undertake extensive continuing military action to accomplish goals in the target, or may
stay mainly on the sidelines, advising or assisting targets' indigenous
forces but taking little direct hand in military activities. Furthermore, intervener may favor the target government (or oppose rebels
who threaten that government) in 11 friendly 11 interventions, or oppose
target government (or favor rebels) in 11 hostile 11 interventions (or
remain essentially neutral toward target government--quite a rare
occurrence). Troops may enter the target frequently, staying for
only short periods; border disputes entail such liqhtning strikes--

T/\11LE 1

Duration Of Encampment And Of Military /\ction
In Hostile And Friendly Interventions

Duratio~ of Action
Hostile
Short·
Long

Friendly
Short
Long

Neutral
Short

Long

Duration of
Encampment
IndiaEthiopiaShort Portuga 1 . Somalia

USLebanon

IndiaNepal

USGabon

IsraelJordan

USSR-

UAR-Yemen

US-Cuba

UN-Cyprus

( GOA) l

Long

FranceTunisia
(Bizerte)

North
VietnamSouth
Vietnam

East
Germany

1rresuming intervention ceases when annexation takes place~

( 1958)

lO

either to oppose the target government in an attempt to take territory
(Ethiopia-Somalia) or to aid the target and help patrol its border

--~

>,,

··':;o/2.
~

t"

areas (India-Nepal). On the other hand, intervening troops may become long-term residents of the target state--undertaking frequent
action to support or oppose the target government (UAR-Yemen and
North Vietnam-South Vi~tnam) or staying mainly on bases {USSR-East
Germany and France-Tunisia). Obviously,
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friendly" interventions--

such as those of the USSR in East Europe or US in Vietnam, especially
after Diem, can have significantly coercive overtones. As seen below,
depending on the mix of the encampment, actionD and affect factors
interventions produce greater or less disruption in tarqet states.
Th~ interventions listed in the Appendix do not include cases
in which troops were sent to target countries and acted solely as
advisers or stayed mainly on military bases.

Examples of such inter-

ventions since World War II would be dispatch of Soviet military personnel to Egypt, Syria, and Cuba, and of US troops to Libya, Spain,
West Germany and many other countries. These are interventions of
long duration with little or no direct intervener military action
inside the target country. However, these interventions may have
profound effects on target's policies or conditions; US bases greatly
affect target states·• economies, and US or Soviet troop presence is
likely to give great pause to decision makers contemplating policies
contrary to US or Soviet interests.

Of course, as Khadafi and Sadat

(not to.mention de Gaulle) have shown, it is possible to call for
and obtain the removal of tr,oops stationed by mutual agreement.

11

Occasionally troops stationed in a foreign country come out of
bases and take action to affect target's domestic disputes, conditions, or policies (they may affect target s foreign policies as
1

~

}'t-1
~

well), and in such cases, agreement between government and intervener may be quite difficult to maintain. Soviet troops have taken
direct action to put down rebellions in Poland, East Germany, Hungary
and (after· 1967) in Czechoslovakia.

In the Hungarian and Czechoslo-

vakian cases, new and i 11-fated governments hardly agreed to such
intervener action.
Only interventions entailing at least some direct military action
by the intervener are included in the Appendix.

The effects of such

interventions are not confined to the economic sector, nor to giving
policy-makers second thoughts about contemplated decisions; direct
military action affects disputes, policies, or conditions in the target through the use or open demonstration of intervener's force. The
more the intervener undertakes direct action in the target--either
opposing or supporting the government--the more controversies will
arise and the more policies, in addition to the economy, will be affected {though not always in ways pr~ferable to the intervener).

Fur-

thermore, the more foreign troops try to assert themselves in a country, and the longer the stay {even to support the target government),
the greater the risk of popular resentment and defiance of their
presence.
Specific effects of intervener presence in targets depend on the
length of intervener's stay, the extent and duration of intervener's
military activity, the magnitude of military force employed, the size
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and power of the intervening state in relation to the target, and
the extent of other powers' interest in the target.

Troops of major

powers long encamped in a small power target may have a more profound
economic and social effect on the target than troops of another small
power, since they probably have more money to spend and since there
may be more of them.

US troops seem to have had a greater economic

and social impact (increasing inflation and job opportunities~ depopulating countryside, and fathering children in South Vietnam)
than Egyptian troops had in Vernen.

Furthermore, tensions between

target government and friendly intervener probably grow faster when
intervener is a major rather than minor power.
Major power intervention is less likely to be disruptive if
military action by the intervener is infrequent and quick, and if
encampment does not last long.

The continued presence of British

and French officers in the armies of East Africa and former French
Equatorial Africa evei after independence (along with low pay for
indigenous troops) constituted a grievance for African military
factions which mutinied in the 1960 1 s.

Massive British and French

interventions followe~ to restore order, prop-up shaky governments,
and reinstate governments that had already fallen.

Thus

9

long-term·

encampment was one factor (along with economic and regional power
balance int~rests) leading to the perceived need for active interven.

tion.

(See Morrison. et.~-, 1972.)

Such interventions did not

cause great condemnation of "nee-colonialism" mainly because host
governments needed major power help (on the other hand, French action
in Suez, Al~eria, and Tunisia was hardly at African government behest)

\
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and did not denounce the troop movements (the East African states-normally vocally anti-imperialist--could not object to French action
in Gabon and elsewhere since they had called for British help).

(See

Wallerstein, 1969:74-79.) The fact that the bulk of major power troops
did not stay -long (Nigeria soon replaced the UK in Tanganyika)--that
army dissidents (as opposed to entrenched guerillas) could be relatively
quickly disarmed--meant that conflicts and resentments at intervener
presencedid not have time to grow.

Other large powers kept out of

the ~ituation, also reducing possible tensions, and British and French
forces had .relatively clear-cut military objectives.

Thus, the quag-

mire nature of the Congo interventions (with vague and ever-expanding
military objectives, competitive military intervention and political
or economic interference by various states, widespread violence, and
competing mass-based political movements) was absent in East and
Equatorial African interventions.

( See Hoffman, 1962.)

In some cases, encampment may be short--troops may quickly enter
and e,stt the target country--and yet military actions may be repeated
so frequently that they constitute a single on-going intervention
(in delimiting such interventionsu researchers can look for gaps
and lulls in activityD ceasefires, intervener's changing political
or military goals or concerns or step-level changes in magnitude
9

of military activity or nu~ber of troops employed).

India's frequent

aid to Nepalz Israel's border clashes and raids on neighbors' territories, Greek border clashes with Balka·n neighbors

ii1

the late 40's
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and early 50 s, or Ethiopian-Somalian clashes in the 60's all tended
1

to come in clusters of specific incidents which could be linked together over certain time periods and, because they came so frequently,
while the same issues continued to preoccupy interveners could
9

reasonably be considered single on-going interventions.

Such inter-

ventions, often involving border disputes, seem to produc~ relatively few
economic effects on ·the targets, but may generate popular resentment
and have profound political implications for the target governments.
Borders are continually crossed or violated; the political and/or·
military weaknesses of the target government are highlighted, as the
government is either incapable of preventing border penetrations or
in constant need of outside interveners 1 help.

Target governments

may lose constituent support in such cases, and leaders may feel compelled to change domestic or foreign policies either to eliminate
conditions which attract the intervener (e.g~, Lebanese and Jordanian
crackdowns on Palestinian groups} or protect the borders (Egypt installs better Soviet anti-aircraft missiles).
Some interventions involving short-term encampment and continued
military action may be neutral with regard to the target government.
A state may act to eJiminate terrorists operating from or taking
refuge in a neighbor's; territory. These might be termed "remedial"
interventions., since intervener attempts to directly remedy offensive
conditibns in the target state.

Remedial interventions may or may not

be meant to pressure1 the target government to act against terrorists
or change offensive conditions; sometimes the target government might
be relieved to see foreign troops controlling a politically volatile
situation (e.g., Jordan-Palestine guerrillas--Israel).
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Thus, duration of encampment in targets seems to increase the
probability that further active intervention will be necessary, and
to affect economic and social conditions, and public reaction, inside the target country (and hence the target government's long-term

political standing)o

Extent and duration of military action seems

to affect certain of the target governments' policies which interest
the intervener, the immediate political popularity of the target government, the safety of individuals, and the loss or destruction of
~

property inside the target.
Two types of intervention seem to entail different combinations
of encampment and military action, and hence different sets of consequences for intervener and target:

(1) interventions in targets•

domestic disputes; and (2) interventions affecting targets' policies
or conditions in the absence of domestic disputes (or in which intervener does not openly take sides in the dispute).

Domestic disputes

are situations in which an elite or mass group or faction (popular,
military, or governmental) threatens or seeks to overturn the government in an irregular power transfer.

Interventions in domestic dis-

putes either favor or oppose the government or opposition groups.

It

is more useful to speak of interventions which either do or do not
affect targets' domestic disputes than to speak of interventions "aimed
at authority structures," since the existence of domestic disputes is
relatively easily determined, and since different variables and costbenefit calculations lead to or stem from interventions in such disputes, as opposed to interventions in the·absence of such disputes.
Again 9 it is important to distinguish hostile and friendly interventions, (Table 2) since different predictor variables seem to relate
to certain classes of intervention.

TABLE 2
Hostile And Friendly Interventions In Domestic Disputes
Or Affecting Policies And Conditions

Hnc:tile

Friendlv

Dom-Dis

China.;.Tibet

France-Cameroon

Pol-Con

Pakistan-India
(Kashmir)

UK-South Arabian
Sheikhdoms
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Once a country establishes siqnificant
interests in another taraet
.
.

state, decisions about hostile interventions, whether in domestic dis,.._

putes or affecting policies or conditions in the absence of disputes,
seem most likely to be affected by variables concerning the potential
strength of the target state's military and government.
terventions since

1948

Hostile in-

have involved interveners and targets of roughly

equal military power, or interveners with significant power advantaqe
over targets. 1 {See Table 3) States seldom intervened in ta~gets
more powerful than themselves, and major power interveners (US, USSR9
UK, France, C~ina) seldom picked on states their own size (though the
US clashed with both the USSR and PRC--in seldom noted interventions-during the Korean war, and though the USSR and PRC have clashed in
publicized interventions}.

In allt there were ten hostile interven-

tions with intervener and target of roughly equal power (nine among
small and minor powers), sixteen in which intervener was at least two
steps above the target in power (on a six point scale), twenty in which
I'

i_ntervener was one power step above target, thirteen in which intervener was one power step below the target, and one (Indonesia into UK
at Sarawak) in which target was more than one power step below intervener.

Note, as well, that hecause of the single ranking of states'

power, circa 1957-59, certain interventions in Korea and Israel were
categorized with intervener less powerful than target.

However, in

1950, South Korea was ,not as powerful as it later became, and North

Korea probably held a power advantage.

Evidently most Arab leaders

felt they had a power advantage over Israel when they invaded in 1948,

@

TABLE 3
Intervener Power Advantage In
Hostile Interventions
"'
-;-

Power of
Intervener (1957-59)

Power of
Target (1957-59)

l

1

6

l

5

Number of Hostile
Interventions (Excluding
Alleged Interventions), 1948-67

6

0
5

2

It

l

~

4

0
3

l

3

l

2

l

l

l

2

6

4

2

5

2

2

4

l

2

3

1

2

2

0

2

1

0

3

6

2

3

5

3

3

4

1

3

3

0

3

2

1

3

l

0

4

6

2

4

5

2

2

0

l

TABLE 3 (Cont d)
1

Power of
Intervener {1957-59)
-::

Power of
Target (1957-59)

Nunber of Hostile
Interventions (Excluding
Alleged Interventions), 1948-67

4

4

0

4

3

2

4

2

1

4

l

0

5

6

15

5

5

8

5

4

1

5

3

0

5

2

0

5

1

0

6

6

1

6

5

9

6

4

0

6

3

0

6

2

0

6

1

0

;::-

lusSR and US
. 2rRC, UK. France
3

west Germany. India, Italy, Japan, Poland, Brazil~ Spain, Turkey,
Mexico, Canada

TABLE 3 (Cont 1 d)

-;:-

4Australia, Indonesia, Belgium, Sweden~ East Germany, Argentina,
Netherlands, Czech, Romania, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, South Korea, Taiwan
5
Hungary, Thailand, Egypt, Bulgaria, Greece, Iran, Malaysia,
Portugal, Israel, Burma, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, North Korea,
South Africa, Philippines~ Denmark, Austria~ Venezuela, Norway, Colombia,
Finland~ Cuba, Chile, Nigeria, Algeria, Morocco
6Peru~ Congo (K), Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Afghanistan,
Ireland, Uruguay, Ceylon, Ghana, Ecuador, Tunisia, Guatemala, Dominican
Republics Sudan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Kenya, Singapore, Tanzania, El Salvador, Jamaica, Cambodia, Nepal Luxembourg, Costa Rica~ Uganda, Haiti,
Honduras, Cameroon, Bolivia, Trinidad, Panama, Albania, Cyprus, Nicaragua, Jordan, Paraguay, Liberia, Somalia, Iceland, Laos, Libya, Togo,
Mongolia Gabon, Zanzibar, Arab Sheikdoms, Muscat and Omant Abu Dhabi,
Hyderabad, Tibet, Bhutan, Brunei, Senegal, Kashmir, Central African
Republic, Congo (B), Rhodesia, Zambia, Nigeria, Niger, Chadi Dalawi,
Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Iraq, Switzerland, New Zea 1and
0

9
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as well.

Thus, cases in which a clearly inferior power intervened in

a clearly superior power were even rarer than Table 3 indicates.

These

findtngs generally correspond to those of Lewis F~ Richardson (1960)
for bilateral interstate wars frcrn 1820 to 1929.

Richardson found

that 61 percent of wars took place between small powers, 36 percent
with major powers (defined by naval strength) attacking small powers
or with small attacking major powers, and only three percent with majors.
fighting majors.

The advent of nuclear weapons may have accentuated

these trends; it seems unlikely (though not inconceivable) that interventions w"ill take place between states able to inflict quick and severe damag1;! on each other.

Of course, long-standing hostile relations,

such as border disputes, lead to hostile interventions even when force
ratios are less than favorable to the intervener.

Interveners often

forget grievances, however, if costs of intervention seem great, and
\

costs of ho~tile interventions, especially when intervening and target
troops clash, are significantly raised by military strength of target
governments.
When contemplating interventions, whether friendly or hostile, in
domestic d·fsputes in foreign countries, governments will consider certain key aspects of force ratios.

Friendly interveners will usually

not be as interested in their own force advantage over target governments as .in target government's force, organizational; and popularity
advantage over opposition groups in the target.

Hostile interveners

wi 11 ca.lculate both their own force advantage and rebels I advantage
vis 1 vis target government.

Obviously, interveners usually pursue

their own interests, and may, if the stakes seem great enough, choose
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to ignore weaknesses in factions they propose to aid or in their own
military position.

Major powers can afford more costly interventions

than minor powers~ and may rely (e.g.~ US in Vietnam) on their own
supposed power advantage over target factions to assure successful
intervention.

In certain US and USSR interventions, factions "calling

for intervention" have been created where none existed so that intervention in pursuit of, major power interests could be legitimized.
Generally, though, facti ans I strength and popularity, and the extent
(geographic, magnitude of fighting, duration, threat to governmental
structures) of the domestic dispute will help condition willingness
(especially of small powers) to intervene in domestic disputes.

Severe

and prolonged disputes in a target may indicate target government's
weakness and/or rebels 1 strength.

Potential interveners, noting signs

of rebel or governmental weakness, may be reluctant to back losers
(President Nasser intervened in Yemen to back a government unable to
oust rebels, and perhaps he ignored signs of rebel strength or governmental weakness, though the rugged Yemeni terrain gave the rebels extra advantages).
The possibility of stalemated, long-lasting, and costly involvement seems somewhat greater for domestic dispute than for policy-condition interventions (13 of 14 hostile and 23 of 42 friendly interventions in domestic disputes lasted more than six months; most friendly
and hostile intervent~ons to affect policies and conditions also lasted
more than six months, but 10 of 34 hostile policy-condition interventions
also lasted less than one week).

Interveners seem wary of hostile entangle-

ments in other countries' domestic disputes; 78 percent of domestic
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dispute interventions from 1948 to 1967 were friendly (support government or ·oppo~e rebels~-which are not always the same thing; Belgian
action in the Congo at times opposed both the central Congolese government and dissident or mutinous groups), while 62 percent of policy,._

condition interventions are hostile.

There seems comparatively little

reluctance to bomb target states, carry out border raids, or even seek
to detach and annex target territory, as long as force ratios seem
even or favorable to intervener, and as long as intervention does not
entail taking sides--especially against the government--in on-going
domestic disturbances.
It is, of course, imPiortant to determine how many and what types
of domesti~ disputes ~ttracted hostile or friendly intervention; in
an initial study using the World Handbook

11. (Taylor and Hudson, 1972)

data on domestic conflict, it appears that while domestic upheaval is
not a sufficient condition for interventions, it borders on being a
necessary condition. • While most states undergoing many riots, deaths
due to domestic violence, or "armed attacks 11 (organized groups seeking
power by violent means) from 1960-67 have not had interventions» 61
percent of states receiving interventions in domestic disputes had
many riots; 50 percent (3 of 6) of states receiving social protective
interventions (interventions protecting a social group--either minority
or majority--in the target from the target government) had many riots
(while all six states receiving such interventions had some riots)~ 83
percent of targets for interventions in domestic disputes were high
deaths due to domestic violence 70 percent of countries receiving
friendly interventions had many domestic armed attacks, while 44 percent
of countries receiving ·hostile interventions had many such domestic

Cl.
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attacks; 17 of 18 countries with domestic dispute interventions and
13 of 15 with policy-condition interventions had at least some internal
armed attacks; in 75 percent of states (16) receiving hostile interventions, governments issued many sanctions against political organizations,
and 43 percent of countri~s with many such sanctions had interventions
(in future research it will be important to determine whether domestic
conflict preceded or followed interventions).

Thus, in general, in the

1960 1 s, intervention~. ~nd particularly friendly interventions, were
considerably more common in states with some internal conflict than in
those with none.

On the other hand, some types of internal conflict--

such as assassinations, elections, protest demonstrations, and political
strikes--had little or no relation to the probability of intervention.
These conflicts seem to entail less threat to continued government tenure
than armed attacks, riots, and widespread violence. 2
Friendly and hostile interventions depend on the types of relations
established between intervener and target governments or societies, as
well as on intervener's calculation of power ratios (though potential
interveners may ignore long-standing friendships and refuse to aid
shaky governments in domestic disputes).

As UK interventions in oil-

rich or strategically located Middle Eastern states have shown, when
desirable policies or conditions in a target are threatened by other
states (or by factions within the target state), friendly interveners
may take account of valued relations with the target and respond militarily (depending, as weil, on the policies and power of countries which
might oppose the interventions).

Long standing hostile relations with

a target state, or long standing friendly friendly relations which are
suddenly jeopardized by a new target government or policy, may bring
intervention to oppose the target government, provided force ratios
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seem favorable to intervener and alternatives to intervention do not
seem available (alternatives will be more readily available to large,
i

wealthy, and powerful states than to small~ poor, or weak states, but
force ratios are more likely to be favorable to the former as opposed
to latter type of states as well).
Several types of relations between states may lead to interventions--especially friendly·interventions.

Both

11

affective 11 and

11

trans-

actional11 relations may exist between states and may relate to interventions.

{See Mitchell, 1970.) Affective relations consist of ideo-

logical ~nd religious ties and similarities, family, clan, and tribal
links, and ethnic or racial ties between states.

These relationsi and

controversies concerning them, have most often characterized small
power interventions since World War II--in Africa (Somalia-Ethiopia)i
Asia (Indonesia-Malaysia), and even Europe and the Middle East (GreeceTurkey-Cyprus).

This is not to say that affective interests caused

these interventions--strategic and political (increase power, change
regional ,power balances, take territory) may have been involved as
well.

However, such clan, tribal, or kinship ties have been common

between small power interveners and targets, much more common than
between major power interveners and their targets.
Transactional interests have commonly characterized major power
interventions; these include international transactions such as social,
economic, military, and political exchanges; in which people or goods
I
I

I

,_j

I

move back and forth between countries.

Major powers are likely to

have many more transactional links, such as trade, investments, economic and military aid, or diplomatic relations, than small powers; small
power transactions are likely to be with major powers, since these
powers have the resources and markets needed by small states.
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Small powers are unlikely to be in a power position to intervene inside major powers to protect such interests, while major powers do
1

have the capability to intervene in pursuit of such interests in smaller
states (e.g., UK and France into Suez, UK into Jordan, etc.).

Ex-

colonists have retained many transactional interests in Asian ·and
African states. and such interests have been ~trong in targets of
British and French intervention (Malaysia, for instance).

Strategic

arid political concerns about regional power balances also r~lated to
these interventions, so that transactions alone may not warrant interventions, but regional power balances also may assure protection
of transactional· interests.

(For evidence of US concern--though not

necessarily of US proneness to intervene--in this regard, see Peterson,
1973.)
Ideological interests are affective, and yet such interests have
related to both major and minor power interventions (US-Dominican Republic; UAR-Yemen; on ideological interventions see Zartman, 1968:188;
and Boals, 1970.)

In general, ideology refers to organized belief

systems and doctrines, such as Communism--anti-Comrnunism, Zionism--antiZionisrn, or "pan" movements designed to unify populations.

Commu'nism

--anti-Communism seems most likely to concern the US and USSR as well
as certain of their smaller client £tates (e.g., South Korea or East
Germany).

Other ideologies may concern medium or small. powers in cer-

tain regions.

Ideological interests may seem threatened by wide-spread

and severe domestic disputes which seem to threaten the governmental
structures of a target state.

Yet, ideological disputes ~ay serve as

justifications for interventions planned for other reasons, such as
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to impose policy changes on the tafget state, or to preserve or
change regional power balances.

For example, power positions and terri-

torial grievances, rather than ideology, may be the main bones of contention between Russia and China; however, such grievances can easily
become molded into ideological doctrines (Mao may raise territorial
claims for domestic purposes in intraparty struggles, with little hope
of actually regaining lost territory), so that it is difficult to separate ideology from more concert or short-tP.rm interests.
Notice that in many interventions to affect ideological positions
or regional power balances, intervener's concern may not be strictly
or even mainly with policies or conditions inside the target; rather,
the intervener may be concerned with the way the target fits into
broader international priorities--e.g., the "Socialist camp 11 or the
11

stable region. 11

It might not matter who specifically rules the target

or what domestic policies are followed so long as foreign policy doctrines do not seem to threaten intervener interests.

Hungarian reforms

seemed acceptable to Khrushchev in 1956 until they came to include renunciation of the Warsaw Pact; since the intervention, many of the
internal reforms sought in 1956 have been achieved in Hungary.

In

general, ideological and regional power balance interventions seem to
entail more diverse mixtures of international and intra-national interests for interveners than other varieties of intervention, and hence
may have less lonq-term impact on policies and conditions inside the
target than other forms of intervention.
In ilddition to ideology and regional power balances. territorial,
social, E~conrn11ic, diplomatic, and military issues may all be raised
during intt"'rventions, and may lead to interventions for evacuation as
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well as to affect target's policies

9

conditions, or domestic disputes.

It is important to examine interventions concerning various of these
issues separately since they seem to involve different circumstances
and consequences.

Issues connected with interventions may not be

-;-_

mutually exclusive. of course, and motives for intervention are seldom
unmixed.

Belgian intervention in the Congo~ for instance, concerned

economic, military-diplomatic (safety of diplomats and troop installations) interests, and evacuation of nationals.

We can never know all

the motivations for national leaders' actions.

However, some motiva-

tions may stand out in public statements or historical analyses, and
these can be used to classify interventions.

Variables associated

with these predominant motivations may be manipulable, so that the incidence and effects of certain types of intervention can be controlled.
For instance, geographic proximity of intervener and target, along
with population pressure on resources inside the intervening state, may
strongly condition interventions to annex territory.

Geographic prox-

imity may not be manipulable, but population pressure on resources may
be eased if resources are obtained peacefully abroad.
lation "lateral" pressure, see Choucri and North, 1972)

(On such popuFurthermore,

interventions to annex territory may not involve as many complicated
political goals as interventions to help a faction in the target gain
power.

The outcome of territorial intervention is, therefore, usually

clearer (intervener either succeeds or fails to occupy territory) and
secondary socio-economic effects (inflation, corruption) of intervention may not be as severe or long-lasting as the effects of prolonged
military meddling in targets' domestic disputes (though if segments

I

\I
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of a popu1ation are detached in territorial interventions, communications and travel may be seriously restricted).

Of course, extent of

political goals in territorial intervention may depend on the degree
of resistance to and duration of fighting involved in the territorial
intervention (territorial interventions are more likely to be coercive
than other forms of i nterventi on--norma lly territory is taken from the
target state), as well as on the extent of territory invaded.

Total

conquest of a foreign country may involve more than territorial interests; it may concern desired changes in target's political, military,
social, cir economic policies as well.

On the other hands while annex-

ation of limited territory along a border may involve administrative
problems, there may be little effort to change local politics; territory may be the main prizes (as in Algerian-Moroccan interventions).
Territorial interventions often relate to social or economic interests in the target.

However, interveners may also undertake econo-

mic or social protective intervention without serious territorial ambitions (e.g., British and French economic intervention at Suez, and,
.-

because interventions were clearly social protective, while territorial
ambitions were less clear, Greek and Turkish interventions on Cyprus).
Social protective interventions tend to protect segments of the public,
whether minorities or majorities, in the target state, as opposed to
elite political factions (interventions in domestic disputes protect
such factions, cind become social protective as well, if elite factions
have a conspicuous mass following which the intervener moves to protect), from the target government.

Irredentist interventions, designed
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to unify or reunify segments of a target state's population with the
population of the intervening state, would be included here as.well,
and usually relate to territorial claims (e.g., Ethiopia-Somalia).
Economic protective interventions entail action by one state to
establish, protect, or guarantee access to economic interests--business
enterprises or access to natural resources--in another state.

Economic

protective interventions are perhaps the most difficult to clearly
identify, since interveners are sensitive to charges of imperialism
and exploitation and may cover up economic motives (probably even more
I

than they cover up territorial motives) with talk of regional power
balances, "stability," or social protection.

French interventions in

former central African.colonies in the 1960 1 s may have related to uranium deposits and the French nuclear weapons program, according to
the New York Times, but their most easily detectable effect was to reinstate threatened governments.

Research identifying, classifying,

and seeking causes and effects of interventions must include careful
attempts to uncover policy debates, records, or statements (from intervener, target, or third country sources) revealing intervener's
goals, to determine what interveners' troops did once they entered the
target, and to identify patterns of economic social, military~ or
9

political behavior inside the target (or its region, or in intervener
-target relations) which reveal effects of the intervention.
Interventions may also tend (whether successful or not) to protect diplomatic or military interests--a besieged embassy or military
post-~in the target state.

French action at the Bizerte naval base
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in Tunisia would fall under the diplomatic-military protective category.
These interventions may or may not involve evacuations of civilians as
well.

They are usually less politically complicated than social or

economic protective'intervention, part·1y because they involve mainly
military, as opposed to political, goals--it is very difficult to force
a government to denationalize a foreign-owned business or to stop persecuting a minority; it may be militarily easier to protect a military
base or embassy, while diplomats try to negotiate a settlement of disagreements with the i~rget government or ~actions.
Distinttions among ideological~ regional power balance, territorial, economic, social, and military-diplomatic protective interventions allow the creation of intervention profiles and specification
of the kinds of actors and circumstances likely to be involved fn various types of intervention (Table 4).

This is useful for those hoping

to control the incidence and effects of intervention.

Since super

and great powers settled most of their territorial and irredentist
claims before World War II, they have undertaken very few territorial
or social protective interventions since 1948 (Table 4), while minor
powers have undertaken many such interventions.

Territorial and

social issues are likely to preoccupy neighboring states, and small
powers are able to carry out interventions in nearby states.

The wel-

fare of ethnic and minority ~roups inside target states was of little
interest to super powers; instead, super powers were almost completely
preoccupied with ideological and regional strategic interventions.
Events inside target states interested US and USSR decision-makers

TABLE 4

Intervener's Power And Types-Of Intervention*
(1948-67), Excluding Alleged Interventions
Intervention Types

Intervener
Power

Territory-Social Protect

r Ideology--

Regional Balance

Economic-Military-Diplomatic_

O*.

31

3

2

4

21

14_

3

12

4

0

4

6

15

2

5

17

33

2

6

8

14

0

;;

*Numbers in ce 11 s represent numbers of i nterventi ans of that type by that type

of pow<!r.

US and USSR (listed in order of intervention frequency).
2 UK, France, PRC (listed in order of intervention frequency).
3 India, Turkey (listed in order of intervention frequency).
4 Australia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Belgium, S. Korea (listed in order of intervention frequency).
5 Israel, ll/\R, s. Vi,,tnani, Greece, Thailand, N. Vietnam, Malaysia,
N. Korea, Philippi m~s (listed in order of intervention frequency).

s. Africa,

6 New Zealand, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Yemen,
Chana, Nigeria, Lebanon, Singapore (listed in order of intervention frequency).
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mainly as they related to regional power balances.

Thus, leaders

worried about super power interventions would do well to keep arguments
about regional security policy out of violent domestic conflicts. Leaders worried about small power hostility would do well to establish poli-

•

cies that provided their neighbors access to resources or territory, and
assurance that minority groups would not be mistreated.
Great powers (UK, France, PRC) were also concerned with ideology
and power balances, but, in the British and French cases, combined
this with economic and military-diplomatic interests:1 in ex-colonies.
Suez was the characteristic intervention in this regard.

British and

French decision-makers worried both about the economic "lifeline" of
the Canal, and about Nasser's impact on regional "stability."

Economic

interests were more clearly related to great power than to super power
. interventions from 1948-67, although this is not to say that desire ·for
conttnued or increased business relations wtth target states did not
affect some super power intervention decisions, since these desires
often relate to definitions of regional or ideological ~•stabilityo"·
Economic and diplomatic-military interventions by middle, small, and
minor powers (ranks 4, 5, and 6) were much less frequent, though certain
lesser powers pursued such interests (Belgium sought to preserve an
economic toehold on the Congo, and North Vietnam and Israel had militarydiplon~tic installations to protect in neighboring states during their
lingering disputes).

Small states do not normally have many economic

interests in neiqhhoring small states--resources and markets are seldom
found close to hrune, and poor states often produce relatively similar
commodities.

Poor states are seldom able to afford many foreign military
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or diplomatic installations either, and have difficulty moving military
. forces gr~at distan·ces (even Belgium relied on US air transport for its
later Congo interventions, and the UK required US transport in its MidEast interventions of 1958).

•

Thus, opportunities for small and minor

power economic-military-diplomatic interventions are quite rare, and
interests must be q~it~ great--as in North Vietnam's need to maintain
the Ho Chi Minh Trail--before such states will undertake such interventions.
Small and minor powers show a marked tendency for territorial and
social protective interventions--which sharply contrasts with super
~nd great power behavi6r--and for ideological and regional power balance interventions.

Such lesser powers' strategic concern may be

somewhat surprising to those who think of the "balance of power" as a
major power game.

Regional power patterns greatlyconcern small powers

with regional political ambitions--states like the UAR or Indonesia,
which pursue ideological and strategic interests in places like Yemen
and Malaysia.

Small powers' ideological and security interests may be

quite different from, and perhaps even in conflict with, those of major
powers.

Small regional powers are unlikely to be greatly concerned

with the world-wide "cold war" or communism; their ideologies are often
related to "pan" movements and processes of social change.

Small

powers may use such ideologies to oppose other regional powers.

The

UAR misadventure on behalf of a 11 progressive 11 regime in Yemen began
shortly after the breakup of the Syrian-Egyptian UAR, and may have
been conceived as a way of discrediting Syrian claims to Arab leadership.

Small powers interested in local balances may, on occasion,
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find ~ommon ground with.major powers from outside the region (Iran
could someday become an anti-leftist intervener in the Persian Gulf
area and this could correspond to certain US interests), but countries
inside and outside a region are likely to have divergent interpretations
of events in and different priorities for the region.

The data show

that•small local powers take more interest in internal social policies
of target states than major powers, and carry territorial claims into
regional power balance or ideological interventions (Indonesia claimed
Malaysian territory and combined--or ornamented--this with a pan-Indonesian ideology).
Conclusion
Several types of intervention have been identified through empirical analysis of cases from 1948 to 67.

Variables associated with

(leading to or affected by) interventions differ among:

(1) hostile

·vs. friend1y interventions; (2) interventions in domestic disputes vs.
interventions affecting targets' policies or conditions in the absence
of domestic disputes; , and (3) territorial vs. economic vs. militarydiplomatic vs. social protective vs. regional power balance vs. ideological interventions~

This may not be an exhaustive classification,

and intervention-re lated issues (territorial~ etc.) are certainly not
mutually exclusive.

However, it is clear that major powers have tended

to indulge in ideological, power balance, economic and diplomatic-military protective interventions, while lesser powers have undertaken
, mainly territorial. social protective, and regional balance or ideological interventions. Clearly, as well, most domestic dispute interventions
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have been friendly, while policy-condition interventions were mainly
hostile, and seemingly produced fewer political complications and
consequences in the target than domestic dispute interventions.

In-

terveners seemed wary of undertaking hostile as opposed to friendly

•

interventions, especially in distant countries.

Costs of hostile in-

terventions--especially in domestic disputes--may appear quite high
(and only major powers can afford them at great distances).

Spheres

of influence also seem to affect cost calculations; relatively few
interv~ntions of any kind took place in the neighborhood of major
powers--most targets from 1948 to -67 were located in Africa, West and
East Asia.

(See author's citation, 1973.)

Interests and alternatives,

as well as cost, determine the incidence of interventions; major powers
seem to have great transactional interests in other states.both in and
out their neighborhoods, but with their wealth, major powers have many
alternatives to military intervention as well.

Leaders of small powers

may perceive few alternatives to direct military action if they hope
to influence events inside neighboring states.

Major powers seem to

react to threats to transactional interests and regional power balances,
while small powers are concerned by affective interests and regional
balances.
tions:

Perceived threats to such interests can lead to interven-

(1) in domestic disputes, or (2) to affect policy or conditions

in the absence of a dispute; but unfavorable force ratios are likely
to discourage hostile long-term involvement in dome·stic disputes.
Policy-condition interventions, since 1948, have been somewhat shorterlived, and force disadvantages may not be quite such deterrents.
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The intervention classifications should make it easier to determine
what effects any particular intervention has on intervener or target
authority structures, economy or society.
9

If intervener is present

for long periods in target (as is likely in economic or social protective, as well as domestic dispute interventions),if troop contingents
are large and fighting is prolonged, and if intervener is hostiie to
the target government (as in most territorial and policy-condition interventions),target citizens are likely to be displaced from their
homes, target communication and transportation are likely to be disrupted, intervener's citizens may become impatient and restive, costs
of troop maintenance will rise, and intervening troops will increasingly conflict with target population.

Shorter-lived and more limited

military actions involved in military-dip1omatic protective, or ideological interventions, in evacuations, or in friendly domestic dispute
interventions backing basically popular and efficient governments may
produce less disruption in the target.

Further study of particular

interventions should reveal the specific accompanying consequences--for
instance, during the French interventions in Morocco and Tunisia in
1956 (which were partly designed to prevent rebel movements across the

Algerian border), many sectors of Moroccan and- Tunisian society were
affected: At one point a labor dispute ar6se over the unloading of
ammunition for US forces in Morocco (sometimes simultaneous interventions greatly compound problems!).

Previously, French army guards had

supervised handling of ammunition shipments, but Moroccan unions came
to view this as an affront to their nation's sovereignty and ordered
workers off the docks.

A settlement was finally reached whereby Moroccan
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guards would man the wharf and French gu·ards would take over after
'ammunition left the wharves.

(New York Timess November 28, 1956, p. 9).

Furthermore, even technically friendly interventions may produce tensions and hostilities in the host society and provoke the hostility of
.

;;-

the hos-t government~

It is politically embarassing for a government

to admit that it cannot protect other states 1 citizens or facilities
in its country, that it needs foreign assistance in domestic disputes,
or that it has acquiesced in foreign police actions in its country or
along ils borders.
Generalizations about interventions, are possible; patterns repeat
themselves and vary according to type of intervention.

However, if the

particular features of certain interventions are not to be overlooked,
intervention classifications must assure maximum homogeneity of events
in a particular class and provide enough classes to describe intervener
or target behavior in most interventions.

The classification presented

here, according to affect (friendly-hostile}, political circumstances
(domestic disputes vs. policies-conditions)~ and economic, pdlitical,
military, territory, or social issues associated within classes and
account for most post-war interventions, their predictor variables, and
consequences.

ManYi other interventions could be cited as examples in

cells of Tables l and 2.

Border disputes seem to represent a certain

genre of interventions with short encampment and frequent military action,
which contrast quite sharply wi'th prolo11ged interventions in domestic
disputes.

Of course, interveners may seize upon target's internal dis-

turbances to attack~ border area, and neighboring states may be affected
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by domestic disturbances as refugees or terrorists flee and are pursued.

A move against a border may constitute intervention in domestic

disputes.

However, if encampment is short and attacks are confined to

border areas~ such interventions may produce fewer problems for and
seem less costly to the intervener than total immersion in target's
domestic dispute (fully backing a faction))_~ Vietnam or Yemen.

Dis-

tinctions among intervention types and characteristics allow more adeq~ate explanatio~s and predictions of intervention occurrence and consequences than are possible in studies which treat intervention as a
single and/or vague phenomenon.

.APPENDIX
A data set .

with interventions was available (Sullivan, 1970)

as this study was undertaken, but it was thought best to re-collect,
re-code,.and augment the data because of certain conceptual and methodological problems.

(Seep. 7 above.)

Therefore, all events in the

existing data lists were checked in the New York Times and other sources.
Additional information about the events and surrounding political circumstances was provided by scholarly histories of the interventions
(Indonesia-Malaysia, for example).

Every event was provided with a

specifiable political or conflict context, thus eliminating unexplained
or perhaps random skirmishes or incursions (such as an apparently isolated border incident).

In addition, the data were supplemented with

interventions reported by Luard and Bloomfield (1968:62-64, 96; Luard,
1970:8-9; Bloomfield and Beattie, 1971 :33-46) and in several regional
chronologies.
The final data list used in this study is presented and categorized
in this Appendix; th~ original data were used only as a starting point,
and they have been changed so much that the author alone bears respon3
sibility for the results.
In the final data set, distinction is made
between interventions alleged by some government or faction, and those
reported 11 factua lly 11

(

s ti 11 not completely substantiated of course)

by non-government media,
ments.

9

by

scholars, or admitted by intervening govern-

Political and conflict context were determined from statements

by governments involved, and by issues reported in the press or by
!

scholars.

(

2

All coding in this study was done jointly be the author and primary research assistant (Robert Ba4mann); the appropriateness of each
case to the intervention definition was discussed as it was coded;
missing or questionable information ~11as noted, and efforts were made
to obtain complete information from books or articles before final
coding.

If we could not say that troops crossed a border in the con-

text of some political issue or conflict, no intervention was recorded.
An intra-coder reliability check (repeat coding for a subset of the
data--a complex subset with many reported or alleged skirmishes) was
run on data for the Ethiopia-Somalia interventions, and it was found
that agreement on all 52 substantive variables was 96 percent.

·~

•
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Here are the sources used in deriving this data:
1.

New York Times

2.

Associated Press

3. Asian Recorder
4. African Research Bulletin
5.

Middle East Journal

6.

Middle Eastern Affairs

7.

Facts on File

8.

African Diary

9.

H. 0. Purcell, Cyprus, (New York:

Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.,

1969)

10.

Fred J. Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, (Syracuse, New York
University Press, 1968)

11.

Nadav Safran, From War to War, (New York:

Pegasus, 1969)

12.

Harold James and Denis Sheil-Small, The Undeclared War:

The

Story of the Indonesian Confrontation 1962-1966, (Totowa, New
Jersey:
13.

•

Rowman and Littlefield, 1971)

David Rees, Korea:

The Limited War, (Baltimore, Maryland:

Penguin Books Inc., 1970)
14. The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, The Indochina Story,
(New York:

Pantheon Books, 1970)
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15. St. Louis Post-Dispatch
16. , The Economist
17.

Marcus G.-Raskin and Bernard B. Fall (eds.), The Viet-~
Reader, (New York:

Vintage Books, 1965)

18. The Pentagon ·rapers, vol. I, (The Senator Gravel Edition;

Boston:

Beacon Press, n.d.)

19. The Pentagon Papers, vol. II, (The Senator Gravel Edition;
Boston:

Beacon Press, n.d.)

20. Th~ Pentagon Papers, vol. III, (The Senator Gravel Edition;
Boston:

Beacon Press, n.d.)

21 .. The Pentagon Papers, vol. IV, (The Senator Gravel Edition;

Boston:

Beacon Press, n~d.)

22. Neil Sheehan et a1 . , The Pentagon Papers, (The New York Times,

.ed.; New York:

Bantam Books, 1971)

23. Michael Leifer, Cambodia, (New York:

Frederick A. Praeger,

Inc., 1967)
24. Donald E. Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for South•

east Asia, (Ithaca, New York:

Cornell University Press, 1965)

25. Robert Shaplen, Time Out of Hand (London:

Andre Deutsch, Ltd.,

1969}

26. Hugh Tinker, The Union of Burma (3rd Ed.), (London:

Oxford

University Press, 1961)
27. Robert Blum, The United States and China

in World Affairs,

(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966)
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32. Leon V. Sigal, "The 1 Rational Policy 1 Model and the Formosa
Straits Crises," International Studies Quarterly» vol. 14
no. 2 (June 1970) p. 121-156
33.

Charles A. McClelland, 11 Action Structures and Communication
in Two International Crises:

Quemoy and Berlin/ p. 473~482,
1

in James N. Rosenau (ed.)~ International Politics and Foreign
Policy, (New York: The Free Press~ 1969)
34 •. Edgar 0 1 Ballance. Malaya:
(London:

35.

The Communist Insurgent War, 1948-60,

Faber & Faber Limited, 1966)

J. M. Gullick, Malaya, (New York:
1963)

Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.,

List of

Interventionsp 1948-67

A=Alleged (By a Government or Po11tical Group)
R=Reported (By Non-Governmental Media or Scholars)
!=Hostile
!!=Friendly
III=Neutral or Non-supportive
l=In Domestic Dispute
2=To Affect Policies or Conditions if no Dispute
3=Pre-emptive or Remedial
a=Territorial
b=Sotial Pr6tective
c=Economic Protective
d=Military-Diplomatic Protective
e=Evacuation
f=Ideological
g=Regional Power Balance
DATE
TARGET

INTERVENER

AI II ,3,

Feb. 25, 1958

Spain (Sp. Sahara)

France

AI2,3,

Dec. 21, 1961

Senegal

Portugal

AI2

Apr. ail 1963

Senegal

Portugal

AI2

Jan., 1965

Senegal

Portugal

RI Il

Jan. 13, 1960

Cameroon

France

RI Ile

Apr., 1964

Gabon

United States

Rlr-ld

Feb. 19, 1964

Gabon

France

A2.,3

.Mar. 16 , 1964

Central African Rep.

Sudan

RI Il

Nov. 11, 1967

Central African Rep.

France

AI 1

Feb. 14, 1965

Congo (Kinshasa)

Uganda

RIIl

Jul. 10, 1967

Congo (Kinshasa)

United States

RI Il

Aug. 13, 1964

Congo (Kinshasa)

United States

RI Ile

Nov. 23, 1964

Congo (Kinshasa)

United States

Jul. 10, 1960

Congo (Kinshasa)

Belgium

RI Ile

Nov. 23, 1964

Congo (Kinshasa)

Belgium

Rlllb.e

Jul. 23, 1960

Congo (Kinshasa)

United Nations

RI I1

'Jul., 1967

Congo (Kinshasa)

Ethiopia

A2

Feb., 1967

Congo (Kinshasa)

Portugal

RI I1

Jul. 20, 1967

Congo (Kinshasa)

Ghana

A2

Sept. 10, 1965

Congo (Brazzaville)

Congo (Kinshasa)

2
RI I2

DATE
Aug. 1963

TARGET
Congo ( Brazz a vi 11 e)

INTERVENER
FraRce

RII l d

Jan. 24, 1964

l<enya

United Kingdom

RIIld

Jan. 23, 1964

Uganda

United Kin9dom

A2,3

Sert. 16, 1965

Uganda

Sudan

AI2

Mar. 26, 1965

Uganda

Congo (Kinshasa)

A2

Nov. 29, 1966

Tanzania

Portugal

RI Ild

Jan. 25, 1964

Tanzania

United Kingdom

RIIIe

Jan. 12, 1964

Zanzibar

United Kingdom

RIIIe

Jan. 13.9 1964

Zanzibar

United States

AI2a

Nov. 1963

Dahomey

Niger

A2

Oct. 1966

Malawi

Portugal

Rila,b

Feb. 1964

Ethiopia

Somalia

Aila,b

June 11, 1965

Ethiopia

Somalia

Aila,b

Nov. 1963

Ethiopia

Somalia

All a, b

Apr. 1966

Ethiopia

Somalia

Ai2a

Feb, 6, 1964

Somalia

Ethiopia

AI2a

Apr. 1966

Somalia

Ethippia

RII2, 3

Dec. 3, 1965

Zambia

United Kingdom

AI2,3

Nov, 1966

Zambia

Portugal

RIIl.3, g

Aug. 23, 1967

Rhodesia

South Africa

RI2,3

May 19, 1956

Tunisia

France

RI2,3,d

Feb 8, 1958

Tunisia

France

AI2

Feb. 14, 1959

Tunisia

France

AI2d

~July 19, 1961

Tunisia

France

RI Il

March, 1964

Tanganyika

Nigeria

R3d

July 3, 1956

Morocco

France

A2

May 21,

Morocco

France

AI2.3

Oct. 7, 1961 ·

Morocco

France

;;

1958

3

DATE
AI2

Ju1.v:-n62

AI2a

TARGET

INTERVENER

Morocco

France

Oct. 8, 1963

Morocco

Algeria

AI2a

July, 1%2

Morocco

Algeria

"

A2

Feb. 26, 1965

Guinea

Portugal

..

AI2a

Oct. 14, 1963

Algeria

Morocco

AI2a

July 6, 1962

Algeria

Morocco

A2 ..

June 1962

France (Algeria)

Morocco

AI2

Oct. 1957

Libya

France

A2,3

Feb. 1964

Burundi

Rwanda

AI2, 3

Sept. 10, 1966

Sudan

Chad

AI2

Mar. 18, 1967

Sudan

Ethiopia

AIIl

July 26, 1963

Cuba

USSR

A

Sept. 6, 1963

Cuba

United States

RII 13d

July 28, 1958

Cuba

United States

AI II3.

Aug. 15, 1963

U. K. (Bahamas)

Cuba

RII1d,e,f,g

Apr. 28, 1965 .

Dominican Republic

Uni terl ·states

RIIIlb,d,e

May 23, 1965

Domini can Repub li C

OAS

AIII2,3,c,g

Dec • 31, 1958

Mexico

Guatemala

RII Ie

April 11, 1948

Columbia

United States

Mar. 1948

Costa Rica

Nicaragua

AI1

Dec. 11, 1948

Costa Rica

Ni caragi.Ja

AI

Nov. 1959

Cos ta Rica

Nicaragua

AI2a

Apr. 1957

Honduras

Nicaragua

AI-

Feb. 1960

Honduras

Nicaragua

AI2a

May 1957

Nicaragua

Honduras

AI2a

Nov. 1965

Chile

Argentina

AI2a,b,e

Nov. 1965

Argentina

Chile

RII 1

June 17. 1953

East Germany

USSR

I

.,

-c;

..

,;

Alll

4
DATE

.;.

TARGET

INTERVENER

AII2,3J

Nov:-1"956

Bulgaria

USSR

AI

Apr. 4, 1948

Bu1 gari a

Greece

RI2,3,f

May 7, 1949

Bulgaria

Greece

A

Apr. 19~ 1950

Bulgaria

Greece

A

1953

Poland

USSR

Rl,f,g

Oct.· 209 1956

Pol and

USSR

RIIluf.g

Oct.· 24, 1956

Hungary

USSR

AI

Oct. 27, 1949,

Hungary

Yugos 1avi _a

AI

Apr. 18, 1948

A1bani a

Greece

AI2,3,f

Aug. 2, 1949

Al bani a

Greece

AI

1959

Albania

Greece

A

Sept. 6, 1948

Yugoslavia

Greece

AI

May 30, 1949

Yugos 1avi a

Greece

AI2

Apr. 16, 1950

Yugoslavia

Bulgaria

AI

Sept. 6, ·1953

Yugoslavia

Bulgaria

AI

Apr. 23, 1951

Yugos 1avi a

Rumania

AI2a

Dec. 1951

Yugoslavia

Hungary

AI

Mar. 1952

Yugoslavia

Albania

All , f

Sept. 8, 1948

Greece

Yugos 1avi a

AI

Oct, 1948

Greece

Albania

- July 26, 1952

Greece

Bulgaria

Rb

Dec. 25, 1963

Cyprus

Greece

Rb

June 1964

Cyprus

Greece

Cyprus

Turkey

June 1964

Cyprus

Turkey

Rb

Dec. 30, 1963

Cyprus

United Kingdom

RII.Ilb

Mar. 27, 1964

Cyprus

United Nations

-;.

AI2a

Rb
. Rb

- Dec. 25 , 196 3

5
DATE

Rilb,f

May 11":7948

TARGET
Israel

INTERVENER
Egypt

Ril b, f

May 15, 1948

Israel

Iraq

RI2,g

June 6, 1967

Israel

Iraq

Rila ,bef

May 15, 1948

Israel

Jordan

RI2,q

June 5, 1967

Israel

Jordan

Rilb,f

May 15_, 1948

Israel

Syria

RI2,g

June 5, 1967

Israel

Syria

Rilb,f

May 15, 1948

Israel

Lebanon

Rilb,f

May 15, 1948

Israel

Saudi Arabia

Rilb,f

May 15, 1948

Israel

Yemen

Rll 2a, f ,g

June 1, 1948

Jordan

Israel

AI2a

Aug. 27, 1950

Jordan

Israel

RIII2,3

Oct. 1953

Jordan

Israel

RIII2,3

May 27, 1965

Jordan

Israel

RIII2,3

Sept. 2, 1965

Jordan

Israel

RII I2 ,3

Apr. 29, 1966

Jordan

Israel

RIII2,3

Nov. 13, 1966

Jordan

Israel

RI2,3,a,g

June, 1967

Jordan

Israel

RII3,g

Mar. 1949

Jordan

United Kingdom

RII13,g

July 17, 1958

Jordan

United Kingdom

RIIl ,3,g

July 17, 1958

Jordan

United States

RI2,f,g

May 23, 1948

Lebanon

Israel

RIII2,3

Oct. 28, 1965

Lebanon

Israel

RIIl ,f,g

July 15, 1958

Lebanon

United States

RI2,f,g

May 1948

Syria

Israel

RIII2,3,a.

Dec . l O, 1955

Syria

Israel

RI2,3,a

March 160 1962

Syria

Israel

'

.

-'"-

\

6

,.

RI2,3a

DATE
Nov. T3; 1964

RI2,3

July 14, 1966

RI2,3
RI2,3a,g

TARGET

INTERVENER

Syria

Israel

Syria

Israel

Apr. 7 1967

Syria

Israel

June 1967

Syria

Israel

'

..;;,

RII I2 g3

Feb. 28! 1955

Egypt

Israel

RI2,3

Nov. l , 1955

Egypt

Israel

RI2,3,g

Oct. 29, 1956

Egypt

Israel

RI2,3a,d,g

June 5, 1967

Egypt

Israel

RI2,3 c,g

Oct. 31, 1956

Egypt

United Kingdom

RI2,3cgg

Oct. 31 , 1956

Egypt

France

Nov. 15, 1956

Egypt (UAR)·

United Nations

AI2a

Feb, 1958

Egypt

Sudan

Rl2 ,3 ,g

June 1967

Iraq

Israel

AI2

Aug. 16, 1962

Iraq

Turkey

RIIl

June 1963

Iraq

Syria

AI2,3

Aug, 15, 1962

Turkey

Iraq

RI2a

Feb. 1958

Sudan

Egypt

RI2e3

Nov. 1962

Saudi Arabia

UAR

AI2,3

Mar. 1965

Saudi Arabia

UAR

AI2,3

Oct. 14, 1966

Saudi Arabia

UAR

AI2,3

Jan. 27, 1967

Saudi Arbia

UAR

AI2,3

May ll, 1967

Saudi Arabia

UAR

J.\12

Oct. 1955

Saudi Arabia

United Kingdom

RII2 ,g

Sept. 2, 1949

South Arabian Sheiks
and Sults

United Kingdom

R ,g

Apr. 1952

So. Arabian Sheiks
and Sults

United Kingdom

RII2pg

May 1956

So. Arabian Sheiks
and Sults

United Kingdom

- RIII ,g

-.

I

7

DATE

TARGET

RII2,g

Aug. 1957

South Arabian Sheiks
and Sults

United Kingdom

R2 9 g

July 1966

, South Arabian Shei'ks
and Sults

United Kingdom

AI2a

May 1, 1954

South Arabian Sheiks
and Sults

Yemen

AI2a

Jan. 1957

South Arabian Sheiks
and Sults

Yemen

July 30, 1966

South Arabian Sheiks
and Sults

UAR

AI2 ,3 119

Sept. 1949

Yemen

United Kin9dom

Al2 ,g

June 1956

Yemen

United Kingdom

Al2,g

Jan. 1957

Yemen

United Kingdom

A12,g

July 1959

Yemen

United Kingdom

Ail ,g

- Mar. 1965

Yemen

United Kingdom

RIIl,f

Oct. 1962

Yemen

UAR

RI 13c ,g

July 1, 1961

Kuwait

United Kingdom

RII3 ,g

July 2.

Kuwait

Saudi Arabia

RII3

Sept. 1961

Kuwait

Arab League

, AI2a

Oct. 1955

Muscat and Oman

Saudi Arabia

RII2

Oct. 1955

Muscat and Oman

United Kingdom

Rlllc,g

July 1957

Muscat and Oman

United Kingdom

AIIl

May 1958

Muscat and Oman

United Kingdom

RIIlc ,g

Nov. l. 1958

Muscat and Oman

United Kingdom

INTERVENER

::

--

. AI2

.
-.,

1961

AI2a

-Oct. 1955

Abu Dhabi

Saudi Arabia

RII2

Oct. 1955

Abu Dhabi

United Kin9dOm

RI!2

Sept. l 5, 1953

Abu Dhabi

United Kingdom

RI

June 12 1949

Afghanistan

Pakistan

AI2a

Sept. 30, 1950

Pakistan

Afghanistan

0

8

DATE
1951

TARGET
Pakistan

INTERVENER
Afghanistan

AI

Jan. 2, 1948'

Pakistan

India

RI

Aug. 20, 1948

Pakistan

India

Ril ,3

Aug. 16 1965

Pakistan (Kashmir)

India

RIIla

Oct. 27, 1947

Kashmir

India

Rila,b

Ju1yJ7, 1948

India (Kashmir)

Pakistan

RI2a

Aug. 7, 1965

India (Kashmir)

Pakistan

AI2

Dec. 9, 1961

India

Portugal (Goa)

_RI2a

Sept. 1958

India

China

A3

Sept. 1959

India (Sikkim)

China

RII2, fg

Nov. 1962

India

United States

RIIl

Feb. 1951

Nepal

India

Rill

J u1y 14 , -196 l

Nepal

India

RIIl

July• 1953

Nepal

India

AI

June 27-, 1960

Nepal

China·

AIII3

1959

Nepal

China ·

Hyderabad

India

Hyderabad

India

Portugal (Goa)

India

, AI

~

· RI2 ,3a

g

July 26, 1948
J

Rl2 ,3a

Sept., 13, 1948

RI2a,b,g

Dec.

RI2,a,b,g

Dec. 18, 1961

Portugal (Diu)

India

RI2,a~b,g

Dec. 18, 1961

Portugal (Damao)

India

AI2,3

Oct. 21

1959

China

India

RI2a,g

Apr. 11, 1962

China

India

AII2,3-,f

Mar. 1950

China

u.s.s.R.

RI2

Augo 27, 1950

China

United States-

AI 1,3, fg

June lQSO

China:

United States

AI2a,f

Apr. ] 951

Chi.na

Taiwan

-:;;

rn;

~

1961-

9

•

,..~.

I

L

I

RI2

DATE
Aug. 27, 1950

TARGET
China

INTERVENER
United Nat ions

RII3,f,g

June 1950 .

Taiwan·
I

United States

RII2e

Jan. 1955

Taiwan

United States

RII2;3,f,g

Sept. 4, 1968

Taiwan

United States

RI2a,ftg

Jan. 10, 1955

Taiwan

China

RI2&,g

June 25, 1950

· South Korea

RI I2e , g

June 27, 1950

South Korea

United States

RII2

July 8, ·1950

South Korea

United Nations

RI2»3,f»Q

July. 2, 1950

North Korea

United States

RI2a, f,g

North Korea

South Korea

RI2

Oct. 1 ' 1950
Oct. 7, 1950

North .Korea

United Nations

RI 12, g

Oct. 14, 1950

North Korea

China

RI2

Oct •.

1950

u.s.s.R.

United States

RI2

Oct. 8, 1950

U.S~S.R.

United Nations

Rll a , g

Mar. 1950

Tibet

China.

A.

Aug. 29, 1959

Bhutan

China

R2e3,f,g

Mar. 19, 1964

Cambodia

United States

RI I Id ,g

1964

Cambodia

North Vietnam

RI2a

Cambod.ia

Thailand

RI2a

j\ug~ 11' 1962
Apr. 1966

Cambodia

Thailand

AI2.

Apr. 28, 1956

Cambodia

South Vietnam

RI2,3 ,f

June 1958

Cambodia

South Vi et.nam

RUie ,f,g

Oct. 25, 1962

Cambodia

South Vietnam

AI2,3

Oct. 1953

Thailand

Burma

RII 2 , 3 , f ;, g

May 179 1962

Tha.i ]and

Unit~ States

RII2,3 ,f,g-

May 24 1 1962

· Thailand

RII2,3 Df,g

May

24, 1962

Thailanp

a.

North Korea

United Kingdom
Australia

i

10

RII2 ,31J ,g

DATE
--··
May 24, 1962

TARGET
Thailand

INTERVENER
New Zealand

AIIIc

1949

Thailand

Taiwan

AIII

.1955

Laos

Taiwan

AIIIc

1949

Laos

Taiwan

Aia~f

Mar. 1958

Laos

North Vi.etnam

All, f

July 1959

Laos

North Vietnam

Ail.f

Dec·. 29 ~ 1960

Laos

.North Vietnam

RIIl,f

Mar. 1961

Laos

United States

RIIl 3,f ,g

May 1964

Laos

Unites States

AIII

June 27, 1964

Laos

South Vietnam

AI 1,f

Oct. 1961

Laos

u.s.s.R.

AIIl ,3, f D9

Nov~ 1965

Laos

Thailand·

AI2

May 1964

South Vietnam

Cambodia

Rila,b.f,g

Oct. 1960

South Vietnam

North Vietnam

RIIl,f,g

Dec. 11, 1961

South Vietnam

United States

RIIld,f,g

Mar. 7D 1965

South Vietnam

United States

RIIl,f,g

June

South Vietnam

Australia

RIil ,f,g

July 15, 1965

South Vietnam

New Zeal-and

RIIl,f,g

July 23, 1966

south Vietnam

Thailand

RIIl,f,g

Aug. 15~ 1966

South Vietnam

South Korea

RIIl,f,g

Sept. 11

South\ Vietnam

PM 11 i pines

AI2a

Jan~- 1959

North Vietnam

Laos

A2

Dec. 6, 1959

North Vietnam

Laos

RI2,f,g

July- 30, 1964

North· Vietnam

South Vietnam

RI2,3,f,g

Feb •.8,.1965

North Vietnam

South Vietnam

RI2,3,f,g

Aug.4o 1964

North Vietnam

United States

' -

---

9

1'

1967

:;,

9

1966

11
·DATE

- TARGET

INTERVENER -

RI Ile

Dec.~1962

Brunei

United Kingdom

RI l, f

Apr. 12, 1963

United Kingdom
(Sarawak)

Indonesia

RIIlc,g

Sept. 16~ 1963

Malaya

United Kingdom

RI1l,f,g

Aug. 31, 1~57

Ma layq

United Kingdom

RIIl,fpg

Aug. 31, 1957

Malaya

Commonwealth

Rlla,ftg

Dec. 29, .19b3 ·

Malaya

Indonesia

RIIL, f

Nov. 1966

Malaya

Indonesia

RIIl

Sept. 1964

Malaya

New Zealand

RIIl,g

Oct. 1964

Malaya

Austrana

RI 11

Aug. 18, 1965

Malaya

Singapore

AI

Dec. 1963

Indonesia

United Ki ngdorn

AI

June 1965

Indonesia

United Kingdom

AI2

Mar. 15, 1964

Indonesia

Malaya

RII 1, f

Nov. 1966

Indonesia

Malaya

RIIl,f,g

Jan. 1952

United Kingdom
(Malaya)

Australia

RIIl,f,g

Jan. 1952

United Kinodom
(Malaya)

New Zealand

RIIl,f,g

Sept. 1955

United Kjl'Jgdom
· (Malaya)

Commonwealth

AI2a,f

Jan 15. 1962

Netherlands (West
Irian-New Guinea)

Indonesia

RI Il

Oct. 25, 1951

Phi 11 i p1 nes

United States

AI2a

July 1956

Burma

China

A3,f,g

1951

Burma

China

AI I I1

1949

Burma

Taiwan

.

;..

FOOTNOTES
1For purposes of, this study, power was treated as 11 potential to intervene" and measured as a country s average ranking, among all other
countries, on gross national product and military personnel. Gross
national product indicates_ i ndustria 1--;--produc ti ve, and technol o_gica 1
capability to support a military interveY,1tion, and, as Rummel (1972}
has shown, is related to a country s size_ {population). Military
personnel indicates fo~ces-in-being; a state like Switzerland,,which
is technologically rather sophisticated, may be relatively unable to
intervene because of small armed forces. Obv-iouslyii these are gross
measurements; Israel ,_with a small population, relatjvely low GNP in
the 1950 1 s, arid relatively small army, has repeatedly emerged as more
powerful ·than its neighbors in battle. Technological superiority,
along with effective- use of weapons (a state can have few troops and
launch many weapons) can make up for numerical inferiority in population and troops. Some· states may be more or less powerful than
they appear in Table 3; armies may be large but relatively poorly
equipped (Mexico or Btazil in the 1950 1 s) or concerned with domestic
police action {Spain); transportation--planes, ships~ etc.--may be
lacking; annies may be topheavy with office"s and may lack fighting
troops (Italy). Nevertheless, if a stat~ has many military personnel,
it is in. a position to use these forces abroad--especially in neighboring states, and with the addition of more weapons, troops, and
transport, to mount rather large-scale intervention; a large GNP helps
a state provide these addi tiona 1 factors. Power was measured for the
1957-59 period utilizing data from Russett et. al., 1963; this interval fell roughly in the middle of the 1948-67 period. States independent after 1960 were rated for· power,utilizing data from Taylor
and Hudson~ 1973. Six power categories were derived, a more co~plete
rating than the usual great power-middle power-small power classification, though still a rather rough measurement.
·
2These ·findings differ, someWha t from a study by Sullivan (1969) which
employed a different intervention data set and multiple regression
1

1

.

-·

analysis.
3
..

·

1

,"
I

To obtain some idea of what might have been missed by starting from
an existing data set instead of comp·letely re-collecting the data, the
New York Times Index was ·complete rechecked for the years 1948 and
m4, .and all events whic_h fit the intervention definition for all
countries in the study were recorded. For 1948, the existing data
included an -New York Times interventions except those concerning the
Palestine War-:---F'orT964, all Times-reported interventions except UK
1nto Uganda and UN into Cyprus appeared in the original data. Thus,
on the basis of the two sampled years, the existing data set, while
not complete, offered a reasonable starting point for careful recoding
-and augmentation.
·

..
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